A d a
I s l a m a n d t h e M u s l i m W o r l d 1 1
killed in an uprising and British authorities condemned Kashani to death in absentia. He fled to Iran in 1921 and began teaching and preaching in Tehran.
Kashani was imprisoned in the 1930s because of his pro- German activities. In 1949, after an attempt on the Shah’s life, he was exiled to Lebanon. In June 1950, he returned to Iran, was elected to the Majlis, and became its Speaker.
During the crisis over the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry and the ensuing conflict with the British (1950–1953), Kashani made and broke alliances with the Fedaiyan-e Islam and the National Front of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq. He was instrumental in the assassination of the prime ministers Abd al-Husayn Hazhir and Husayn Ali Razmara.
Kashani was an anti-British, anticolonialist, anticommunist, constitutionalist, nationalist, and pan-Islamist religious- political leader. Although Kashani’s opinions about Iranian nationalism, the role and function of the sharia, and attitude toward the West differed from his clerical predecessors and successors, political activities of the Shiite ulema after World War II were greatly inspired and influenced by his views and activities. Indeed, many of his ideas were elaborated by leaders of the revolution of 1978 and 1979, including Ayatol- lah Khomeini, and formed the foundation of the Islamic government.
See also Fedaiyan-e Islam; Iran, Islamic Republic of; Majlis; Mosaddeq, Mohammad.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Akhavi, Shahrough. “The Role of Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949–1954.” In Mosaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. Edited by James Bill and Roger Louis. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988. Faghfoory, Mohammad H. “The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran with Particular Reference to Ayatullah Hajj Sayyid Abulqasim Kashani.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978.
Mohammad H. Faghfoory
ADA
Like all legal systems and theories, Islamic law and its legal theory are not free from ambiguity and tensions. Nowhere is such ambiguity more pronounced than in the treatment of ada or custom (alternatively called urf) in Islamic legal theory.
Generally, the term ada is derived from Arabic, and means local customs, recurring habits, and social mores of the people. In the context of the epistemology of Islamic law, especially as it relates to what constitutes formal sources of law, classical Islamic jurisprudence does not recognize cus- tom as a formal source. In the normative structure of Islamic
law, it is the Quran as God’s revealed word that is rated as the first primary source. Prophet Muhammad’s sunna, that is, his conduct, authentic sayings, acts, and behavior that he ap- proved is rated as the second primary source. In addition to these two sources there other sources (or legal principles) such as the consensus (ijma) of Muslim jurists or scholars and analogical reasoning (qiyas)—these combined then constitute what have become the normative formal sources of Islamic law.
However, notwithstanding the accepted normative hier- archy of what constitutes formal sources, Islam’s encounter with other host cultures has compelled Islamic legal theory to evaluate the status of custom. For example, through such encounters, ada, that is, the hitherto ambiguous source, has throughout the history of Islamic legal theory served as a flexible legal principle that helps Islamic law to evolve and thus meet the challenge of changing circumstances and times. This assertion finds ample support in Muslim juristic think- ing. For example, a reflection on the founding jurists of the two main Sunni schools of Islamic law, namely, the Maliki and Hanafi schools, shows how various legal rules that were passed by the founders of these schools were based on the strength of communal practice and norms. A good example here is the ruling passed by Imam Malik b. Anas (d. 795 C.E.) that a woman cannot contract herself in marriage. On the same question, the Hanafi jurist, Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 767 C.E.) gave a different ruling that allowed a mature woman to contract herself. What is crucial to note here, though, is not so much the question of which of the two opinions is better, but rather the fact that the basis of the two legal rulings is primarily informed by social reality and what is popular communal practice. Noel James Coulson in his seminal article titled “Muslim Case Law” has presented a cogent argument in which he demonstrates that the opinion of Malik reflects the dominant view of marriage and the position of women within a predominantly patriarchal tribal society of Medina. And by contrast, Abu Hanifa’s judgment mirrors the cosmopolitan nature of Kufa where women enjoyed a slightly more accommodating environment than in Medina.
Although often denied, the impact of ada in Muslim legal theory is also evident in Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafii (d. 819 C.E.), founder of the Shafii school. For instance, the force of communal praxis and the ethos of Egypt obliged al-Shafii to change a range of legal rulings that he sanctioned while in Baghdad before his migration to Egypt.
In addition to the aforementioned early jurists, the effi- cacy of ada is also stressed by Abu Ishaq al- Shatibi (d. 1388) whom Wael Hallaq in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories regards as representing the “culmination” of maturity in Islamic legal theory. A critical reading of Shatibi’s legal philosophy illustrates that ada, though often measured under the concept of maslaha (public good), does occupy a central position in his legal thought. For Shatibi, Islamic law in its early phase, that is, in the prophetic era of Muhammad,