references to al-Suhraward⁄’s statements connecting fut≠wwa organizations to the shar⁄å.22 It is not surprising then to see Ibn al- Mimar use s≠f⁄ metaphors for internal hierarchy, where the essence of the fut≠wwa is in the “kab⁄r” (elder or greater in rank) and “ibn” (son or pupil). In many respects the s≠f⁄ spiritual model of a p⁄r and mur⁄d was mirrored in fityån, and in these organizations there was a hierarchy of its members whose main objective was to uphold the precepts of Islam.23 Scholarly debate over al-Nåsir’s and al-Suhraward⁄’s complex roles in the fut≠wwa organizations and over al-Suhraward⁄’s contributions to reforming social institutions to influence a s≠f⁄ theology is important to understanding the Suhraward⁄ s≠f⁄ order. Recently, scholars argued that caliph al-Nåsir’s fut≠wwa involvement was a part of his social reform policy to bring about greater stability to the region. However, Paul Wittek believes that al-Nåsir’s motives were to counteract the threat of the crusader hostility and to unite the Islamic world by means of patronizing the fut≠wwa organizations.24 The main problem in Wittek’s theory is that caliph al-Nåsir was not in the vanguard in defending against the Crusaders. In fact, when Salåh ad-d⁄n requested military and economic support from caliph al-Nåsir, to defend against the Crusader aggression, he was given a minimum and insufficient number of troops. In addition to this aspect, Wittek argues that al-Nåsir – being the caliph of Baghdad, which had a considerable amount of historical, political, and religious significance to the global Islamic community – was mainly interested in preserving the prestigiousness of Baghdad as the center of Islamic culture by protecting Muslims from both Crusader invasions and anarchistic fut≠wwa members.25 Wittek’s interpretation of al-Nåsir is one that positions the caliph in the center of Islamic politics, and as the commander of the faithful (“amir al-mumin⁄n”) whose objectives were to protect the regional borders, even if it meant subverting private social organizations like the fityån. For some scholars Wittek’s arguments do not take account of the nature of the relationships between the caliph and non-governmental private social organizations. To scholars like Taeschner, the grass-roots popularity of fityån along with their independent political and economic capacity was the real threat to the established caliphate institution. According to Taeschner, caliph al-Nåsir’s role in the fityån was mainly to strengthen the authority of the caliphate by being the “caliph of unity.”26 He thinks the critical weakness of the fut≠wwa was that it had a vacuum of
THE LIFE OF SHAIKH ‘ABÁ HAFS UMAR AL-SUHRAWARDÛ