Islamic History — 1948 A History of the First Arab Israeli War
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📝 লেখা 📖 পিডিএফ

38 THE UN STEPS IN the Zionist delegates had been wary. This may have affected Bevin's deci- sion. Historians have since argued about Britain's reasons. Some have sug- gested that Bevin and the cabinet had not been entirely straightforward: by threatening the two sides with the prospect of the unknown and the unpre- dictable, Britain's intention had been to force the Jews and/or the Arabs to accept the latest set of Whitehall proposals or to agree to a continuation of the Mandate. Certainly David Ben-Gurion, then and later, believed that the move was a ploy designed to prolong British rule: Bevin would hand the United Nations an insoluble problem; the United Nations would flounder and fail, and Britain would be reempowered to stay on, on its own terms, without UN or US interference.4 Other historians (myself included) have taken the British decision at its face value: Bevin and his colleagues had truly had enough of Palestine; pass- ing the ball to the United Nations was their only recourse. In the aftermath of world war, Britain was too weak and too poor to soldier on. IZL and LHI veterans and their political successors have since claimed that it was mainly their terrorist campaigns that ultimately persuaded Bevin and the British public to abandon Palestine. Others have pointed to the large-scale Haganah operations of 1945 -1946 (the railway line and bridge demolitions) as being decisive: these portended an eventual full-scale British-Haganah clash that Whitehall was unwilling to contemplate. Also, the struggle against the Ha- ganah's illegal immigration campaign was a headache of major proportions. Most historians agree about the importance of the growing Anglo-American rift, the DPs, and the pressure from Washington in the British government's decision-making: given the Cold War context and Britain's financial insol- vency, Whitehall could ill afford to alienate Washington over a highly emo- tional issue that, when all was said and done, was not a vital interest. The British decision of February 1947 was firmed up over the following months by bloody events on the ground, in Palestine, in the Mediterranean, and in Britain itself; Jewish provocations and British reprisals spiraled almost out of control. British efforts to block and punish Jewish terrorism and ille- gal immigration took on new, bloody dimensions — though, it must be added, British officials and troops by and large displayed restraint and hu- manity in face of Jewish excesses.5 By the end of 1947, with evacuation only months away, Britain appeared no longer capable of properly governing Palestine and had lost the will to continue. The violence of the IZL and LHI underlined the moderate Zionists' argumentation in Washington and Lon- don that, in the absence of a solution — that is, a Jewish state — Jewish des- peration would approach boiling point.

— পৃষ্ঠা ৫৫ — লেখাটি পিডিএফ থেকে স্বয়ংক্রিয়ভাবে নেওয়া, তাই ভুল থাকতে পারে। সন্দেহ হলে আসল পৃষ্ঠা দেখুন।