36 STAKING CLAIMS Arabs were offered a measure of local autonomy (responsibility for municipal affairs, agriculture, education, and so on). The plan also provided for the im- mediate transfer to Palestine of one hundred thousand DPs and eventual in- dependence for Palestine as a unitary (or binational) state. In September, the British convened a conference in London, attended by British officials and representatives of the Arab states, to discuss the plan. But nothing came of it. The Zionists, who did not attend, insisted on "Jewish statehood," and the Arabs demanded "immediate Arab independence." The American response was equally unequivocal: on 4 October 1946, Truman formally rejected Morrison-Grady, hesitantly endorsed partition and Jewish statehood (a solu- tion, he said, that "would command the support of public opinion in the United States"),81 and called for an immediate start to "substantial" immi- gration. Truman's statement was in large measure prompted by the upcom- ing midterm American elections. Attlee was bowled over: he complained that Truman "did not wait to acquaint [himself] with the reasons" for the plan.82 Meanwhile, the Haganah pressed on with its illegal immigration campaign. On 27 January 1947, the British took one last shot at resolving the crisis. They reconvened the London conference, this time with the AHC repre- sented. But the Zionists continued to boycott the talks, and the United States declined to send an observer. The Arabs continued to refuse anything short of complete, immediate independence, and the Jews, anything less than Jewish statehood in all or part of Palestine. With no acceptable military solution to the Jewish guerrilla-terrorist and illegal immigration campaigns, and with no political solution to the Zionist- Arab impasse, Britain had reached the end of the road.
— পৃষ্ঠা ৫৩ —
লেখাটি পিডিএফ থেকে স্বয়ংক্রিয়ভাবে নেওয়া, তাই ভুল থাকতে পারে। সন্দেহ হলে আসল পৃষ্ঠা দেখুন।