Islamic History — 1948 A History of the First Arab Israeli War
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34 STAKING CLAIMS nicer community anywhere." By contrast, two hundred yards down the road, he later reported, was "the stenchiest Arab village I have ever seen," where Crossman was treated to tea "on the [earthen] floor of a filthy hovel."74 And Aydelotte later wrote: "I left Washington pretty strongly anti-Zion- ist. . . . But when you see at first hand what these Jews have done in Pales- tine . . . the greatest creative effort in the modern world. The Arabs are not equal to anything like it and would destroy all that the Jews have done. . . . This we must not let them do."75 Buxton was later to compare the Haganah to the American revolutionary army, "a rabble in arms in the fine sense."76 The AAC's report was released simultaneously in Washington and Lon- don on i May. It represented, roughly, a compromise between the views of its two component blocks, the American and British. The committee accepted that most of the DPs wished to settle in Palestine and recommended that "100,000" entry permits be issued "as rapidly as conditions will permit." The committee sympathized with the propensity of each side to regard Palestine as its homeland and rejected partition. For the short and medium term, the AAC recommended that the British Mandate be converted into, or contin- ued under the guise of, a United Nations trusteeship. Later, Palestine should be granted independence within a unitary or binational framework. The AAC's recommendations were unanimous. But the AAC had done nothing to heal the basic Anglo-American rift. Truman once again endorsed the passage of a hundred thousand DPs to Palestine and approved the scrapping of the white paper's land sale provi- sions, which the AAC had deemed discriminatory; Attlee ruled out mass im- migration until the Yishuv was disarmed (which he knew was a nonstarter). The Jewish Agency endorsed the report's immigration recommendation but rejected all the rest. The Arabs rejected everything. They demanded im- mediate independence for an Arab-ruled Palestine, not "binationalism," whatever that might mean, and called for an immediate cessation of immi- gration. One Foreign Office cable, in the wake of the report, spoke of Arab hatred of the Jews as being greater than that of the Nazis. The AHC — in a letter from Jamal Husseini to Attlee — issued an "ultimatum" and threatened "jihad." In a follow-up interview with British high commissioner Sir Alan Cunningham, Husseini declared his willingness "to die" for the cause. When Cunningham responded that this didn't really trouble him and that what worried him was the welfare of "the ordinary Arab population," Husseini re- joined that "they were prepared to die too."77 The publication of the report triggered violent demonstrations in Bagh- dad and Palestine; in Beirut, the US Information Center was set 011 fire. At least one Baghdad newspaper called for jihad: "The Arabs must proclaim a

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