2 2 STAKING CLAIMS limit to their covetousness and they prevent others from enjoying the Good. . . . They have no pity and are known for their hatred, rivalry and hardness, as Allah described them in the Qur'an."34 But World War II was a crucible from which both the Jewish and Arab na- tional movements would emerge strengthened and largely triumphant. The war's vast weakening of British (and French) power and the concomitant rise in national consciousness and ideologies in the third world resulted almost immediately in the liberation from imperial rule of vast domains, stretching from Indonesia through India to the Arab Middle East. At war's end, Trans- jordan (later Jordan), Syria, and Lebanon became independent, and other Arab territories — including Egypt and Iraq — enjoyed a loosening of the im- perial grip. For the Jews, the world war meant, above all, the Holocaust. But while de- stroying Zionism's main potential pool of manpower, Eastern European Jewry, the Holocaust also reenergized the movement as a powerful vehicle of the victimized and stateless, who now enjoyed the international commu- nity's sympathy. In a larger sense, history was repeating itself, to the benefit of Zionism. As the pogroms in Russia in the 1880s had launched modern Zionism, so the largest pogrom of them all propelled the movement, almost instantly, into statehood. And much as World War I had issued in the first im- portant statement of support for a Jewish "national home," the Balfour Dec- laration, so the aftermath of World War II resulted in that decisive interna- tional warrant, the United Nations Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947, which would underpin the emergence of the State of Israel. In effect, the white paper policy remained in force through the war, even though Churchill — a pro-Zionist — had taken over the premiership in Lon- don in May 1940. In October 1941 he had written: "If Britain and the United States emerge victorious from the war, the creation of a great Jewish state in Palestine inhabitated [sic] by millions of Jews will be one of the leading fea- tures of the Peace Conference discussions."35 But during the war, there was, in fact, little Churchill could do, apart from winning the war quickly enough to save at least some of Europe's Jews. A secret cabinet committee he had set up in 1943 had recommended, as he had sought, a switch in British policy in favor of partition, but it was never acted upon. And although Churchill was continuously peeved by the Arabs' pro-Axis behavior, he knew full well that Britain needed a quiescent Middle East in the rear of its fighting formations and could not afford to rile them over Palestine. As Colonial Secretary Mal- colm MacDonald put it, "If there was trouble in Palestine . . . there would be repercussions in Transjordania, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and even echoes of that trouble in India."36 But Churchill did authorize the establish-
— পৃষ্ঠা ৩৯ —
লেখাটি পিডিএফ থেকে স্বয়ংক্রিয়ভাবে নেওয়া, তাই ভুল থাকতে পারে। সন্দেহ হলে আসল পৃষ্ঠা দেখুন।