Islamic History — 1948 A History of the First Arab Israeli War
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📝 লেখা 📖 পিডিএফ

2 O STAKING CLAIMS British units pushed into the casbahs and the rebel strongholds in the hill country and virtually annihilated the bands after coercing much of the rural population into collaboration. Dozens of houses were demolished, crops were destroyed, rebels and their accomplices were hanged, and thousands were jailed. In suppressing the rebellion, the British fenced and mined Pales- tine's northern borders and secured towns and crossroads around the coun- try with reinforced concrete police and army posts, called Tegart forts (which were to figure large in the battles of 1948 and mostly exist to this day, serving as Israeli and Palestinian Authority police stations) . In identifying the rebels' infrastructure, the British were assisted by the Haganah Intelligence Service, organized toward the end of the rebellion, and by newly created Op- position-aligned, anti-Husseini "peace bands," that denied the rebels entry into dozens of villages. There was no formally announced end to the rebel- lion, but hostilities tapered off in spring and summer 1939, with the surviving rebels fleeing to Lebanon and Syria. Yet the rebellion, coming as it did as Britain faced a worldwide three-front war against Japan, Italy, and Germany, almost succeeded — not militarily but politically. From the September 1938 Munich crisis onward, Britain came to view its Palestine policy almost exclusively through the prism of its needs and interests in the forthcoming global struggle. Simply put, London sought to appease the Arabs to assure quiet in the Middle East, which sat astride Britain's lines of communication to southern Asia and the Far East. In May 1939 Whitehall issued a new white paper. It promised Palestine's inhabitants statehood and independence within ten years; severely curtailed Jewish im- migration, limiting it to fifteen thousand entry certificates per year for five years, with all further Jewish immigration conditional on Arab approval (thus assuring an overwhelming Arab majority when independence came); and significantly limited Jewish land purchase. In sum, this amounted to a complete reversal both of the Balfour Declaration policy and its much- modified translation, the Peel Commission recommendations: Palestine was to remain Arab, and there would be no Jewish state. The Yishuv denounced the white paper as "illegal" and "appeasement" and mounted huge protest demonstrations; the IZL initiated sporadic attacks on British installations. The Palestinian street was overjoyed. But al-Husseini — as was the Pales- tinians' wont — managed to pluck defeat from the jaws of victory. Instead of welcoming the British move, which Winston Churchill denounced as a cow- ardly "surrender to Arab violence," al-Husseini and his colleagues rejected the white paper. They flatly demanded full cessation of Jewish immigration, immediate British withdrawal, and immediate independence. In the brief months before world war broke out, nothing changed. The

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