Islamic History — 1948 A History of the First Arab Israeli War
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i8 STAKING CLAIMS inquiry, this time a royal commission, headed by Lord Peel. On 7 July 1937 the commission published a 404-page report. It exhaustively traced the his- tory of the conflict and present realities and concluded both that the Man- date was unworkable and that the Jews and the Arabs could not live under one political roof. The commissioners recommended partition, with the Jews getting 20 percent (the Galilee and much of the Coastal Plain) on which to establish a state, and the Arabs getting more than 70 percent (Samaria, much of Judea, and the Negev), which should eventually be fused with Trans- jordan to create an enlarged Hashemite state under Emir Abdullah. Some- thing less than 10 percent of the country, including Jerusalem and Bethle- hem, with their holy sites, and a strip of territory connecting the capital to the Mediterranean at Jaffa, should be retained by the British. The commis- sion further recommended that the bulk of the three hundred thousand Arabs who lived in the territory earmarked for Jewish sovereignty should be transferred, voluntarily or under compulsion, to the Arab part of Palestine or out of the country altogether. The commission "balanced" this by recom- mending that the 1,250 Jews living in areas earmarked for Arab sovereignty be moved to the Jewish area — deeming the proposed transaction "an ex- change of population." In their testimony before the commission, the Zionist mainstream repre- sentatives had laid claim to the whole of the Land of Israel — the traditional Zionist platform. But in private conversations, Weizmann and others indi- cated a readiness for compromise based on partition as well as, quite proba- bly, suggesting the "transfer" solution to the demographic problem posed by the prospective large Arab minority in the Jewish area. Zionism's leaders, from Herzl through Menahem Ussishkin and Arthur Ruppin, had periodi- cally proposed — in private letters and diaries — transfer as the requisite solu- tion to the "Arab problem." But transfer had never been adopted by the movement or any of the main Zionist parties (including the right-wing Revi- sionists) as part of a platform or official policy. Once the Peel Commission had given the idea its imprimatur, however, the floodgates were opened. Ben-Gurion, Weizmann, Shertok, and others — a virtual consensus — went on record in support of transfer at meetings of the JAE at the Twentieth Zionist Congress (in August 1937, in Zurich) and in other forums. To be sure, these advocates realized and usually acknowledged that the idea was impractical and unrealistic — the British could not be expected to carry out transfer, and the Yishuv, even if willing, was powerless — and trans- fer was never adopted as official Zionist policy. Yet through the late 1930s and early and mid- 1940s Zionist leaders continued in private to espouse the idea. For example, Weizmann in late January 1941 told Ivan Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador to London: "If half a million Arabs could be transferred, two

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